by Jason Tang
Today, when foreigners think of China, one of the first things that come to mind is invariably the Tiananmen Square incident. Almost thirty years later, the incident has crystallized into a legend of oppressed people who long for freedom and democracy rising up against a totalitarian regime—a perfect black-and-white tale to be repeated over and over again, with no one ever pausing to consider whether what he or she has been told contains the whole truth. Within China, the incident remains a very sensitive topic. The discussion of it is largely kept off the Internet, and rarely takes place between parents and children, resulting in vague and cursory impressions for the younger generations. For those involved in the incident, time has not successfully healed the wounds buried deep within their hearts. Many have become leaders in Chinese society, as businessmen, scientists, or professors, but at the mention of the incident the thirty-year-old pain still twinges. As for the Communist Party (CPC), although it has successfully guided China in recovering from the incident and continuing the path of reforms and opening-up, it is under political interrogation from many for its actions, and is forced to devote much effort to keeping the incident “hidden.” Whether for China’s global perception or for the development of its own society, the hide-it-in-a-closet method is very unhealthy. People will not forget, and the longer the incident is kept “hidden,” the greater chance it has of becoming more and more contorted. If left unaddressed, the incident is a burden that will always weigh on the CPC’s shoulders, reminding its leaders that although they have led China to become the world’s second largest economy, bringing it ever closer to the great dream of national revival, on its path to success there is an indelible shadow seeking to undermine all of its accomplishments. If, in the past, due to political realities and the need to focus on growing the economy, the CPC cannot devote its efforts to giving an explanation, then today the CPC is more ready than ever before to discard the burden. It is important that President Xi Jinping address the problem head-on in his second term, and give the Chinese people and the world a proper explanation. The CPC’s way of handling the incident derives from its fear that a reevaluation of it would seriously harm its legitimacy. Although such a fear would likely be accurate in the few years directly after the incident, the great feats that the CPC have accomplished with reforms have considerably strengthened its leadership position. It ought to have confidence in the path, ideology, institutions, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as to possess the drive to directly face its past actions. Under these circumstances, a reevaluation of the incident will not only not jeopardize the CPC’s legitimacy, but would effectuate a peaceful reconciliation between many conflicting sides and views in China’s complex society today and help the CPC gain increased popular support. For such a large and intricate party, the most essential principle to maintaining the right to rule is the ability to self-reform. It must be true to facts, for historical nihilism is exactly what a party that believes in historical materialism is fighting against. The incident cannot be effaced, and its causes, nature, and consequences ought to be reevaluated to reflect the truth. Xi Jinping’s first five years in office mostly revolved around the key strategy of “deepening reforms.” In his decade of leadership since 1978, Deng Xiaoping laid the groundwork and redesigned China’s economic system, and now it is up to Xi to make sure that reform reaches all the previously unreachable corners. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the CPC must be relentless in continuing its self-reforms with the intention of curing the most complex and difficult diseases. As the economy trends toward stabilization, the political side should be where the surgical knife lands next. The Tiananmen Square incident is a deep scar in China’s forty years of reforms, and its reevaluation, led by the CPC, would help underscore the resilience and long-lasting efficacy of Deng’s blueprint. In order to advance to this next phase of reforms, which will be more precarious, the CPC must be able to unite as much of the populace as possible. To those directly or indirectly involved in the incident, a reevaluation would be seen as a projection of confidence, a commitment to integrity and historical materialism, and a firm determination to tackle all the problems that Chinese society faces. Around the time of the incident, the CPC’s leadership was in a process of reshuffling. Both the forces of the “left” and the right were censured, leaving those who were more moderate—who most closely aligned themselves with the views of Deng—in charge of the Party, government, and military. Deng at the time was ready to hand over the reins, but he needed to ensure that the remaining party leadership would be able to successfully execute his vision. Deng sidelined political reforms in favor of economic reforms as he saw the country veering toward turmoil. In the ten years after Deng started the reforms and opening-up program (1978), the CPC largely followed a vacillating path of conflicting ideologies between the “left” and the right as the leadership explored in the dark for the best route forward. However, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and the 1992 Southern Tour Talks, ideological conflicts were mostly forgone in favor of economic growth, and thus the general direction of reforms was firmly set. This resulted from Deng’s resolution to sustain his blueprint of reforms and espouse the Four Cardinal Principles, which consists of upholding the socialist path, upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, upholding the leadership of the CPC, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. These four principles laid the foundation for and defined the outline of Deng’s reforms and protected it from veering off course, thus strengthening its overall reach as well as reaffirming the CPC’s right to rule after the tumultuous decade of the Cultural Revolution. A fundamental reason for the CPC’s ability to maintain power lies with its ability to maintain traditions. Whereas, in the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev was quick to denounce Joseph Stalin for his flawed ideologies and egregious policies, Deng chose to separate Mao’s mistakes from his accomplishments. Thus, Mao’s ideology was preserved, and as a result the CPC’s policies and actions from 1935 to right before the Cultural Revolution (1966)––three decades of history guided by Mao Zedong Thought––were reaffirmed. Khrushchev might have believed that by discarding Stalin’s failures he would be able to distance himself and the party from his predecessor and begin a new path, but Deng and the CPC leadership realized that no matter how high a tower is built, it will inevitably crumble if its foundations disintegrate. And thus, while it is clear to all that Mao made grave mistakes during the Cultural Revolution, a reiteration of his Thought as separate from the Cultural Revolution helped secure the CPC’s foundations after a decade of turmoil. In a way, the populist upheaval of the Tiananmen Square incident bears strong resemblance to that which the country witnessed under Mao. Therefore, even before turning violent they had the potential to throw the country back under Cultural Revolution style chaos, which would certainly jeopardize Deng’s reforms. The nature of the Tiananmen Square incident is very complex, as is that of those who charged into Tiananmen Square that day. There were four distinct groups—patriotic students who sought to protest against corruption for the betterment of the party and the country; criminals who took advantage of the chaos to commit crimes of brawling, vandalism, and arson; ignorant and naïve students who succumbed to the incitement of foreign subversive forces and took part in a coordinated effort to sabotage China’s socialist system; and student leaders who colluded with the foreign subversive forces and led the sabotage campaign. It is essential that the CPC leadership today clearly separate those four groups. The senseless mixing of the four groups directly led to the lack of a rational understanding of the incident. Some are innocent students, others are criminals; some ought to be forgiven, others can never be; some acted the way they did as a result of China’s own political climate, and others took part because of direct foreign incitement. A reevaluation must clearly divide the four groups and treat them separately. The patriotic students and intellectuals must be recognized as such, and an appropriate explanation ought to be given to them and their families. For those who actively fought to subvert the party and the government, the reevaluation must clearly condemn them, but also make sure that the condemnation applies not to those patriotic students or those who succumbed to the incitement because of naïvety. A reevaluation of the incident cannot evade the question of the method used to end this upheaval. Although it is dreadful for an army to fire on its own people, one must take into account the overall global climate as well as China’s own domestic climate. In the late 1980s, communist governments across the world were toppling as a result of popular uprisings guided by an “invisible hand.” In the middle of the decade Deng recognized this trend, and paused political reforms in order to prevent the blind fervor from spreading to China. Seeing regime after regime fall, Deng realized that a reaffirmation of the party’s most fundamental ideology (the Four Cardinal Principles) must take place to protect the CPC’s leadership position lest those who favored bourgeois liberalization take charge of the country. The second principle—upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship—was Mao Zedong’s conception for the basis of the CPC’s leadership method, calling for separate treatments for the people (those who support the socialist system) and the enemy (those who are against the Four Cardinal Principles), for whom the dictatorship part is utilized. In Deng’s eyes, many of those who charged into the Square fall under the category of the enemy. Deng’s actions might represent a slight overestimation of the number and strength of the enemy, but under the circumstances of the time it proved much more beneficial to be cautious than overly confident. History has shown that only the CPC’s extraordinary skills prevented China from suffering the same fate as all the other socialist countries. However, Deng’s use of force was by no means a righteous action; it was simply the least harmful one. Although it put a direct end to the subversive forces and stabilized the CPC’s leadership position, it also killed China’s newly realizing political reforms. Today, Xi Jinping has taken on the title of “core” leader, and has both the political capital as well as the firm resolve to continue Deng’s reforms and take it to the next level. Thus, the Tiananmen Square incident is a historical problem he cannot sidestep. He must tackle it head-on and reevaluate it in the spirit of historical materialism and integrity. For those Chinese people and foreigners alike who are still bound by the stiff ideological viewpoints held during the time of the incident, they must realize that today’s world is different from the world back then, and today’s China is different from the China back then. Although the incident represents a time in the CPC’s history when it was suffering from difficult problems both at home and abroad, the renewed efforts toward reforms and opening-up after 1992 led China to become the world’s second largest economy and one of its strongest powers. Today’s China, under the leadership of the CPC, is actively integrating into the globalizing world. Domestically, the 18th Party Central Committee, led by Xi Jinping, is vigorously promoting the fifth modernization—the modernization of the party’s administrative institutions and capabilities—and undauntedly reforming its own weaknesses. At a time when democracies across the world are suffering from populism, xenophobia, and fragmentation, the CPC is experimenting with novel political institutions. Now, if the West still looks at China solely through the lens of the Tiananmen Square incident and clings on to the singular perspective of the exceptionalism of Western liberal democracy, its observations and understanding of China will never be impartial.