by Marijke Perry
On Tuesday, May 23rd, the Philippine army attempted to capture wanted terrorist Isnilon Hapilon in his hide-out near Marawi, a Philippine city on the southern island of Mindanao. The raid went south, with the military failing to apprehend Hapilon, and the resulting firefight sent “at least 15 gunmen” from the militant group Maute fleeing into the city (Samuels). Violence escalated as more Maute soldiers arrived and reinforcements came from other radical Islamic groups in Mindanao and from abroad. The government initially advised civilians to lock themselves indoors due to the militants firing automatic weapons and setting fire to public buildings, but this recommendation inevitably changed when Maute was able to seal off Marawi and fight back military attempts to free the city from the terrorist group. The government had to acknowledge that they’d underestimated the severity of the situation. By the 25th, thousands were evacuating from Marawi (Gomez), a process that would continue for 3 months as the siege continued.
According to the press, an attack of this scale was unexpected and unprecedented, but history as well as recent declarations by President Rodrigo Duterte show that the Philippine government should have anticipated violent action from radicals. Prior to the siege, Duterte had threatened to place Mindanao under martial law to deal with the growing radical sentiment throughout the island. The radical views had been festering since the 1960s when at least fourteen drafted Muslim soldiers had been executed without trial for allegedly protesting their living conditions. The mass execution, now known as the Jabidah Massacre, incited a great deal of unrest within Mindanao, and for the past few decades, groups like the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have fought the Philippines government in hopes of creating an Islamic state (McKenna). MNLF have been active within the last decade, and groups like Maute have recently assembled and begun pledging allegiance to ISIS. The Philippine government was relatively unprepared for an attack despite decades of growing radicalism, recent attacks, and acknowledgement of the threat.
Since the attack, the military has been focused on containing and reducing the amount of the city that Maute has under its control. As of August 19th, the city of Marawi had been mostly cleared of militants, with the remaining forces walling themselves up in Marawi’s grand mosque. Much of the city remains a ghost town, abandoned in the evacuation and and destroyed during conflict. Most of the 200,000 residents have been displaced, many with no intention of returning even after the conflict is over (McKirdy). Maute and the other militant groups may have lost control over much of the city, but they have left a permanent, scarring impact on the area.
President Duterte made poor choices leading up to the siege of Marawi, but the government as a whole acted well in the fall out. He could have more properly prepared for the terrorist threat which had been growing as treatment of Muslims worsened and as ISIS spread into East Asia. The attempts to take out Isnilon Hapilon were a step in the right direction of dealing with growing terrorism in the Philippines, even if the attempts failed, but the lack of protection on Marawi, a city endangered by the raid, showed a matching lack of foresight. The military and government, however, showed some prudence as it diverted its efforts from targeting Hapilon to containing the Maute group and reclaiming areas while evacuating civilians and minimizing casualties.