by Alex Janower
Why Did President George W. Bush Decline the Kyoto Protocol?
At the 1992 Earth Summit at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 197 countries agreed that they were “concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.” The concerns and objectives outlined at that conference evolved into the Kyoto Protocol, a voluntary international treaty aimed at reducing the effects of global warming by requiring its constituents to reduce emissions of pollutants. Because it was a UN-coordinated agreement, there was an expectation that many countries would join. The protocol required 55% of the producers of the world’s greenhouse gas output be represented via ratification before it could be put into effect. This was only achieved in 2005 after a lengthy negotiation but the United States chose not to participate. While President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore had voiced support for the Protocol, they did not bother to send the treaty to the senate because it seemed a hopeless cause. Under their successor, George W. Bush, the most sustainability-focused candidate in 2001, American citizens widely supported the Kyoto Protocol and government regulated climate action. However, Bush refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the US.
Bush outwardly disparaged the Kyoto Protocol because it excluded developing countries and posed general economic risk to the U.S. He disagreed with excluding developing countries because it thwarted climate rehabilitation and because it unfairly burdened industrialized nations. His argument, however, did not appropriately assess the programs that would quickly integrate developing countries into the criterion of the pact. His major concerns on behalf of the US economy included damage to the consuming public due to diminished product availability and heightened unemployment as a result of efforts to comply with the Protocol’s hefty demands. In framing his arguments, the President relied on economists’ worst-case scenarios which predicted the need for tax offsets far too costly to be palatable to the Republican majority at the time. Bush also failed to acknowledge the burgeoning green technology industry and the likely economic consequences of neglecting climate action. President Bush employed flawed logic to reject the Kyoto protocol, his actual repudiation of which may have stemmed from other motivations such as his personal stake in the oil industry or the nation’s bias toward isolationism at the time.
Why Was the Kyoto Protocol Necessary?
Greenhouse gasses trap the sun’s rays in our atmosphere, creating a hothouse effect that increases the earth’s temperature. Though fluctuations in the climate occur naturally, the earth’s net temperature has risen an abnormal 1 degree Fahrenheit since pre-industrial times, which poses a threat to sea levels, weather patterns, water resources, food production, and more. As evidence, levels of gaseous carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have grown by 31 per cent, 151 per cent and 17 per cent respectively primarily due to human influence. Fossil fuel use, land use changes, and agriculture accumulate excessive atmospheric concentrations of these gasses. Industrialization plays a major role in this. The United States emitted four times as much carbon dioxide in 1990 as it had in 1930. In fact, as environmental researcher Dr. Elizabeth Blum recounts, “In 1990, the United States and the developed nations accounted for two-thirds of all global emissions.” The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) noted that “the United States has regularly emitted between 5,000 and 6,000 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per year since 1990.” Carbon dioxide serves as the primary constituent to global warming, reportedly causing 48% of the problem.
In response, the US signed the UNFCCC at the 1992 Earth Summit. Among other sustainability-related goals, the Convention aimed for developed countries to lead the way in stabilizing greenhouse gases “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” with legally binding emission reductions. The Convention drafted the Kyoto Protocol as a concrete agreement on global emission reduction targets over five years. On December 11, 1997, the Protocol was agreed and announced in Kyoto, Japan to require industrialized countries, the world's largest per capita polluters, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% collectively from 1990 levels during a “budget period” from 2008-2012. Targets varied by country. Proposed reductions ranged from 8% for many European Union states to 7% for the United States, 6% for Japan and Canada, and 0% for Russia. The Protocol even permitted increases of 8% for Australia and 10% for Iceland.
In accordance with the UNFCCC, which put the onus on developed countries to reduce harmful emissions, the Kyoto Protocol did not require developing countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions until they accumulated enough economic stability to do so. Instead, undeveloped countries would participate via sustainability projects by promoting environmentally sound development technology. Countries that exceeded their targets in any one year could bank the surplus and redeem it in a subsequent year’s emission totals. In the anthology Climate Change: In Context, environmental scientist James Corbett provides the following example of carbon banking: “if a country has to reduce emissions by 10%, but actually reduces it by 15% one year, the extra 5% can be used against the following year's target of 10%, essentially negating the previous year's reductions.” Additionally, in July of 2001, 178 nations participated in the Bonn Conference where they architected a hopeful compromise relative to the Kyoto protocol, permitting emissions trading using carbon banking, in which national governments issued tradable certificates to firms and individuals that showed compliance with targets. Similarly, at the international level, industrialised nations could purchase a part of another industrialised nation’s fulfilled Kyoto allocation. In addition, industrialised nations could earn credits by promoting specific sustainability projects, particularly in developing nations. While less effective in protecting against global warming, the allowances for trade promoted worldwide economic well-being.
At the time of the Bonn Conference, the need for climate action was at an all-time high. Around the world, global warming had already harmed food production as agricultural plants struggled to cope with higher temperatures and accompanying changes in rainfall, leading to dehydration, poor pollination, and slowed photosynthesis. This resulted in both health and economic costs - in 2001, food prices had risen 20% from recent decades. Meanwhile, the EPA recorded a rise in total greenhouse gas emissions in the US by 4.71 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents during the first year of Bush’s presidency. In response to a survey conducted by Yankelovich Partners, Inc., polling 1,025 adult Americans in March of 2001, 69% of respondents agreed that the US government gave in to business interests too often with regard to the environment. However, the popular support for climate action did not motivate the administration to support Kyoto itself.
Why Did Bush Criticize The Kyoto Protocol for Excluding Developing Countries? Why Wasn’t His Assessment Valid?
Bush commenced a letter he wrote in March of 2001 to senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts with the assertion, “As you know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.” In order to fairly address Bush’s concern, one must first understand the context.
First of all, the UNFCCC recognized that nearly all greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere were products of industrialized countries. It noted that “emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.” UNFCCC simply obliged the largest emitters to take the first step in climate action. The agreement recognized “the need for developed countries to take immediate action in a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards comprehensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect.” UNFCCC cited a strong relationship between income and per capita carbon dioxide emissions and that the world’s largest per capita emitters were the major oil producing countries.
The Kyoto Protocol excluded developing countries from reduction requirements in order to foster their economic development. In fact, certain nations, such as India, were permitted to increase emissions to meet developmental needs. Developing economies were required to report their emissions levels and develop national climate change mitigation programs such as environmentally sound development technologies. Industrialized countries could then earn carbon credits for implementing such programs via the clean development mechanism, which allotted credits for certain projects implemented within developing nations by industrialized nations. This strategy allowed developing nations to gradually integrate into the world economy, and, with the benefits of economic globalization, to eventually shoulder some of the costs of counteracting global warming.
Bush’s administration and Congress at the time feared that pardoning the developing nations would negatively impact the US economy. Bush rejected the notion that such populous nations would not be held accountable and worried that the double-standard would reduce the number of available trading partners for the US. In his view, absolving huge population centers from bearing their share of the burden would be unfair. Also, Bush felt threatened by the growing competitiveness of India and China in the context of the global economy. Indeed, both of those countries experienced yearly GDP growth rates of between 6% and 14% between 2000 and 2010. Finally, in 1997, the US Senate had unanimously labeled the protocol unjust and ineffective for addressing global climate change. In direct response to the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate voted 95-0 in favor of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which outlawed engaging in international treaties that would regulate emissions.
However, the responsibility of climate action morally fell on the US as an economically stable primary polluter. Calculations in Our World In Data by climate-focused statisticians Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser clearly illustrate the connection between income and emission rate. According to their report, the high and upper-middle income countries emitted 86% of global emissions, low and lower-middle income only expended 14%, and the very poorest countries (hosting only 9% of the global population) produced a diminutive 0.5%. To quote,
Even several billion additional people in low-income countries — where fertility rates and population growth is already highest — would leave global emissions almost unchanged. 3 or 4 billion low income individuals would only account for a few percent of global CO2. At the other end of the distribution however, adding only one billion high income individuals would increase global emissions by almost one-third.”
North America, which is dominated by the US, emitted the largest share of global emissions at 18%. Ritchie and Roser point out that “The United States [had] emitted more CO2 than any other country to date: at around 400 billion tonnes since 1751, it is responsible for 25% of historical emissions” while “many of the large annual emitters today – such as India and Brazil – are not large contributors in a historical context.” These numbers illustrate the US’s cumulative impact and thus responsibility for reducing greenhouse gasses in our atmosphere. In 1996, the total carbon emission by one American was 19 times as much as one Indian, while the total of all US emissions amounted to more than double that of China’s. In order to offset its negative impact, the US would have to shoulder a large share of the recovery effort.
Furthermore, according to a group of UN-sponsored scientists, “developing countries are twice as vulnerable to climate change than industrialized countries.” For example, climate change threatens to exacerbate the Indian monsoons, melt the Himalayan glaciers, and cause water scarcity in tropical Asia. These risks will remain until capable, industrialized countries such as the US take action. And, if the developing countries were to have been held accountable for reductions in order to better allow the US to compete in the global economy, the rich would stay rich and the poor would stay poor. Such a policy would privilege US interests and, furthermore, perpetuate the situation that causes the US to emit disproportionately.
Bush’s argument against excluding developing countries was shortsighted, however, because the protocol outlined a plan for including them over time. Developing countries bore unique responsibilities to promote environmentally sound development technologies to further their own progress. Plus, industrialized nations could accelerate developing countries’ compliance by employing the clean development mechanism to equip them to more rapidly do so. Supporting countries’ industrialization could greatly contribute to the world economy while eventually securing new participants in the protocol. Facilitating that process could secure the US some lucrative economic allies.
What Were Bush’s Economic Arguments Against the Kyoto Protocol? Why Weren’t They Valid?
Bush and his administration lamented that the potential costs of cutting greenhouse gas emissions would be too high as the US would have to reduce fossil fuel burning in power plants, buildings, automobiles, and other basic infrastructure. Indeed, in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush cited statistics that predicted drastic costs of cutting greenhouse gas emissions. According to David Victor, a professor in Climate, Atmospheric Science, and Physical Oceanography at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, the US government would have to demand over $1000 per household per year in taxes in order to meet Kyoto’s reduction standards. This sum paralleled annual national spending on all federal clean air and water programs at the time combined. On a national level, the costs for complying with Kyoto would reduce total US economic output by “up to $400 billion” by 2010, as reported in July of 2002 by James L. Connaughton, the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. This prediction corresponded with an estimate from 1998 by the Energy Information Administration, an independent statistical and analytical agency within the US Department of Energy, which predicted $397 billion in gross domestic product (GDP) losses. Even climate-action supporter and economist Nicholas Stern acknowledged that climate change prevention could result in mild to moderate market losses amounting to around 1% of global GDP according to his report, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Additionally, the 2001 Bonn Conference set penalties for failing to fulfill Kyoto reduction goals. It was agreed that “countries failing to meet their 2012 emissions targets would be required to suspend emissions credit purchasing and make up their target deficiency, plus a penalty of 30%, during the second commitment period.” This alarmed President Bush, as it threatened to drive up the economic costs of the protocol.
However, the majority of environmental organizations argue that the government applied worst-case scenarios in deciding to reject the Kyoto Protocol. Corbett informs that “An oft-quoted figure—provided by the White House Council on Environmental Quality—of a $400 billion cost for Kyoto implementation is at odds with figures cited in other studies.” In stark contrast, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) anticipated in 1997 that implementing the protocol would cost as little as $7–12 billion. While the US Department of Energy assumed that all reductions would be domestic, the CEA accounted for international emission trading, which curtailed their estimate. Victor agreed that emission trading would spare the US from the intensity of the expense: “Full-blown trading could lower the annual costs a factor of 10 - to more palatable $100 per American household.” Plus, the US would be able to rack up emission trading credits with programs such as joint implementation, which determined that industrialized countries could earn credits from jointly implementing specific projects that reduce emissions, and the clean development mechanism. And while Stern acceded to the government’s projection of a 1% loss of GDP, he also predicted that it would save the country from sacrificing 20% of GDP in the future when preventive action would become unavoidably necessary.
Apart from specific financial costs arising from reducing emissions, President Bush expressed concern for the general well being of the economy. First, in order to meet Kyoto’s standards, he worried that companies might be forced to lay off workers in industrial facilities. He especially feared this because the unemployment rate had ballooned to 5.7% in the first year of his presidency after six years of consistently hovering at around 3.9%. Second, he worried that the drastic reduction expectations would demand premature disposal of energy equipment about half of which relied on coal, the most greenhouse gas intensive of all fossil fuels, for electrical generation. At a time when California and other Western states already struggled with the availability of energy, Kyoto’s standards posed a threat to the consuming public. In a letter he wrote in March of 2001, Bush asserted, “A recently released Department of Energy Report, ‘Analysis of Strategies for Reducing Multiple Emissions from Power Plants,’ concluded that including caps on carbon dioxide emissions as part of a multiple emissions strategy would lead to an even more dramatic shift from coal to natural gas for electric power generation and significantly higher electricity prices compared to scenarios in which only sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides were reduced.”
Finally, Bush anguished over the potential threat to the oil industry, specifically. Following Al-Qaeda's attack on the twin towers in Manhattan, New York on September 11, 2001, the US increased domestic oil drilling efforts to avoid sourcing all of its oil from middle eastern countries suspected of involvement with terrorist groups. The flourishing domestic oil industry accounted for about 2% of GDP in 2001. Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and California served as the top five oil producing states in the nation. As the second-largest greenhouse gas emitter among major industry sectors, the oil industry would undoubtedly suffer under Kyoto’s ambitious emission reduction standards.
On the other hand, economists argued that green technology, as promoted by the Protocol, would create new jobs and bolster long-term economic prospects to offset Bush’s concerns. Stern explained that “Entire new markets will be created in low-carbon energy technologies and other low-carbon goods and services worth hundreds of billions of dollars each year,” and that “changes in energy technologies and in the structure of economies have created opportunities to decouple growth from greenhouse gas emissions.” Additionally, Kyoto was not exceedingly binding. The US would have opportunities to renege if the US economy were to, in fact, recede. The protocol only committed its signatories for one period of three years. Countries could withdraw by providing one-year’s written notice.
Regardless, it is impossible to debate the economic costs of engaging in climate action without also answering the question: what are the economic costs of doing nothing? The resulting environmental devastation would likely precipitate a long-term economic crisis. Scientists, for example, predicted that further temperature change would damage agriculture, threaten fisheries, and spoil tourist destinations. Damage from flooding stemming from rising sea levels would bear steep costs. Natural disasters could threaten natural resources and provoke widespread migration and conflict. All of these losses would weaken tax bases and increase national debt. As the Stern Review estimates, “the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year… If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more.” In fact, Stern adds grievously that climate inaction would “eventually severely damage world economic growth, causing disruptions comparable to those of the world wars and Great Depression of the twentieth century.” These issues would become increasingly difficult or impossible to reverse with time.
Why Else Might Bush Have Turned Down the Kyoto Protocol?
Bush’s objection to the Kyoto Protocol may, in fact, have stemmed from his personal stake in the oil industry, his general isolationism, and disapproval of government over-involvement.
First, the Bush family earned its fortune in the oil industry. Following in his father, George H.W. Bush’s footsteps, young Bush began seriously investing in the oil industry from a relatively young age and earned his first million within ten years. While searching for troubled oil companies to buy, Harken Oil and Gas, a much larger Dallas-based firm, took special interest in Bush’s Spectrum 7 because of Bush’s family’s celebrity. The merger proved to be incredibly lucrative. As a Washington Post article written in 1999 summarized, “In addition to the seat on the board, [Bush] received more than $300,000 of Harken stock, options to buy more, and a consulting contract that paid him as much as $120,000 a year in the late '80s.” Though Bush sold out to Harken to enter politics, Bush and his family always maintained a large presence in the oil industry. Kyoto’s greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements would diminish demand for oil in favor of more sustainable energy sources, thereby directly threatening Bush’s family’s wealth.
Second, the US government at the time leaned toward isolationism and discouraged excessive federal intervention. The Senate’s unanimous support for the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution prohibited international emission reduction agreements in favor of domestic programs to avoid overabundant foreign governmental entanglement. A letter to the editor featured in The New York Times in 2002 titled “The Treaty Shy US” criticizes Bush for endorsing isolationism. The author argues “The failure to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocol on global warming is hurting the United States in the eyes of our allies,” and blames this and Bush’s inaction in the Middle East on Republican attitudes toward engaging on the global stage. The letter refers to disarmament experts who advised the US government to shy away from international treaties and accuses them of undercutting efforts to strengthen “international rule of law.” Additionally, full-scale emission trading would require the government to distribute carbon credits to specific companies, which raised many complications with direct engagement on the federal level. Bush and his Republican party were wary of any increases in federalism which biased them against Kyoto.
Conclusion
Declining to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol was a poor policy decision. While the administration criticized it for excluding developing countries and posing general economic risk, it largely exaggerated the evidence and failed to focus on the bigger picture. Even though developing countries emitted only a tiny percentage of atmospheric greenhouse gasses, Bush disapproved of absolving huge numbers of people from experiencing the negative economic impacts of reducing emissions while the US and other industrialized nations shouldered the burden. However, the Kyoto Protocol aimed to gradually incorporate developing countries in a manner which safeguarded their long term economic prosperity. Plus, the US emitted a lion’s share of global pollution and so practically and morally needed to take responsibility to address the problem. In regard to Bush’s fears of harming the US economy, Bush cited worst-case scenario projections and did not take emission trading into account when anticipating tax increases and GDP sacrifices. And though Bush worried that profitable oil revenues would diminish and national unemployment rates would skyrocket, he ignored the promise of new markets in sustainability and green technology. Finally, Bush did not acknowledge the future economic consequences of neglecting climate action. At the root of his reluctance lay a personal stake in Big Oil and an aversion to global entanglements and expanding federal bureaucracy. Bush may have sought to protect the oil industry in which his family was heavily invested. And Bush and his Republican government preferred isolationism and downplayed executive power. They dissented because Kyoto directly contradicted the tenets of the isolationist Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
Though the US declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it came into force in February of 2005. Corbett records that “as of December 2007, 175 countries, representing 61.6% of 1990 emissions, had offered their formal support for the Kyoto Protocol.” Most participating nations met Kyoto’s standards during their first commitment period with a few outliers. Unfortunately, some countries may have misrepresented their emission reductions to escape penalties. And, multiple countries reneged on their commitments, such as Canada in 2006 under Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Also, many environmental activists denounced Kyoto’s provisions. Greenpeace, an independent campaigning organization that defends the environment, asserted “that even if they were met, the Kyoto targets will produce an actual overall reduction of gases of just 1% or 2%—falling well short of 60% reduction in greenhouse gases that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) asserts is necessary to significantly mitigate climate change.” Ultimately, Kyoto largely collapsed after its second commitment period due to weak enforcement and management.
Since declining Kyoto, US legislators have tried and failed to enforce environmentally sustainable measures. Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, attempted to address the concerns regarding the Kyoto Protocol and adopt a series of resolutions in a new agreement called the Copenhagen Accord in order to protect the environment. This accord required participating countries to provide funds to incorporate developing countries into the global economy and sustainability initiatives sooner. However, the Accord never substantiated due to poor timing and lack of faith in Kyoto-style emission reduction plans. US legislators also rejected measures such as the American Clean Energy Leadership Act and American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, which would have established domestic regulations on greenhouse gas usage and sustainable energy sources.
Still, global annual greenhouse gas emissions have declined since 2001. According to the Public Review of Draft U.S. Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, the global community has reduced approximately 660.09 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents between 2001 and 2017. In that time, the US has reduced 6.52 million metric tons and yet still consistently contributes about 0.7% of the greenhouse gasses in our atmosphere per year. This may be credited to the increasingly popular green movement and the rise in global sustainable development. Yet while non-governmental organizations and private business motivated by the consuming public have driven climate action, many believe it's time for the US government to step in to take more aggressive action, as evidenced by the impressive crowds at youth climate strikes and popular support for Senator Ed Markey and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Green New Deal and other sustainable platforms emerging in the 2020 election. Whether or not a new Kyoto-like global treaty eventually materializes, a growing number of US voters seek to enact new legislation to hold the US accountable for strict and aggressive emissions reduction targets to forestall further climate change. Hopefully our government will this time find the political will to follow through.