by Rishi Khanna
Introduction
High incumbency rates—the reelection of politicians in a given election cycle—can be viewed both positively and negatively. Over time, reelecting a single politician over multiple cycles can lead to said official forcing the same, often-outdated ideas onto the legislative floor for decades. This is often the criticism of the United States’ government; the most recently-elected Congress has an average age of 57.6 years in the House of Representatives and 62.9 years in the Senate, with most having served multiple terms. However, as the US proves, reelecting incumbent politicians can have beneficial results. As politicians gain experience and time in office, their productivity increases and relationship with constituents develops, creating a more meaningful and effective connection between government and people. Decision-making improves with experience, and politicians having multiple terms in office allows them to work on long-term projects benefiting the population.
In the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the Bharatiya-Janata Party (BJP) recaptured the government in seemingly-dominant fashion, winning 303 out of the 543 seats available. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reelection indicates support of his previous policy trends centered around aggressive reform and corruption crackdowns. However, many of the members of Parliament (MPs) from the last Lok Sabha will not be present to implement any policy themselves; while the BJP as a whole held on to the majority of seats, only 230 MPs (42.4%) were reelected. Meanwhile, in the 2018 American midterm elections the Senate remained in the hands of the Republican party while the Democratic party snatched control of the House from the Republicans. Despite the party change, 370 out of the 408 incumbents in both Congressional houses were reelected. (The House has 435 representatives, the Senate 100.) This remarkable gap in reelection rates demonstrates the “anti-incumbency” phenomenon gripping recent Indian elections. Though the idea that Indian citizens actively seek the removal of representatives already in office is an unlikely theory, the tendency clearly shows the unique effects of Indian societal thought on its government.
In the following sections, three primary factors behind high anti-incumbency rates are explored along with comparisons to the US. The discussion centers around style of democracy, corruption (with further examination of cash flow in elections), and economic growth. Potential solutions for increasing incumbency rates are also suggested.
I. Style of Democracy
Considering both the process and themes of elections is important in examining factors of anti-incumbency. Today, both India and the US can be classified as successful democracies in terms of voter turnout and government stability. However, multiple factors lead to India’s higher anti-incumbency rates. The nature of India’s parliamentary democracy—including political party divides, election style, and party decisions—influences the high anti-incumbency rates due to large sects of the population left unsatisfied by the government.
India’s democracy—the largest in the world—incorporates a British-style parliament, led by the highest-ranking member of the majority party. This democracy is also the world’s largest in terms of the number of political participants. In the 2019 Lok Sabha election, the Election Commission of India (ECI) recognized seven national parties and 59 state parties; the commission also acknowledged the registration of 2,293 unofficial parties. As a result, there are currently 37 different parties with representation in the Lok Sabha, each with small percentages of available seats (save for the BJP’s 55.9% majority). In contrast, as of the 2018 Congressional elections America’s political system has a total of 32 parties, with only two—the Democratic and Republican parties—gaining any major traction on the national front. Additionally, the election system in each of the countries produce extremely different results.
Both American and Indian citizens elect their representatives through a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, meaning that the party with the greatest percentage relative to its competitors captures the seat in the legislative body. However, because of the large number of competing political parties in India, the percentage required for a politician to win a Lok Sabha seat is lower than that for a US congressman. Just in 2019, the BJP won the election handily—with an average vote share of 39.5%, leaving the majority of the population unsatisfied. This system leads to parties playing a “numbers game” in which the parties’ focus transforms from appealing to locals and implementing comprehensive policy to strategically placing candidates in different locations so as to maximize seat gains in Parliament. As a result, rather than working for change and favorability in their respective districts, individual Indian politicians focus on appealing to central figures within their party to gain party support when elections come around. The US, on the other hand, creates an arguably more idealistic democracy—that is to say, the majority of the population is satisfied by election results. Because of the strength of the two-party system, the FPTP system practically requires a simple majority to win; in the 2018 midterm elections, the Democrats needed 52% of the popular vote to take the House from the Republicans. The other thirty parties are rendered irrelevant in Congressional elections; as of now, there are only two independent legislators, both of whom are in the Senate and usually side with the Democratic caucus in voting procedures. Even in years when the majority of the popular vote does not translate to a victory (as is the case due to the controversial Electoral College as well as gerrymandering, the redrawing of district lines to favor a party), American politicians still need a higher percentage of votes than their Indian counterparts to win elections.
The question as to how the US has developed into a two-party system can be answered through an examination of the past. The history of American political parties can be characterized as one of paradigm shifts and party absorption. Major ideology changes have only occurred during times of distress; as a result, these shifts happen rather sparingly, often after decades of following one set of principles. For example, aspects of former president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal policy (written to alleviate the strife of the Great Depression) were kept by all subsequent presidents, regardless of party, until the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Over time, this has strengthened major parties and suppressed smaller parties from springing up. By the end of the Civil War in 1865, the two-party system as known today was fully established in American politics. American parties have also mastered shifting their own policy in order to cover their bases and appeal to public sentiment as well as new target populations. The most prominent example is the shift of the Republicans to becoming the “party of the people” by adopting a Progressive mindset in the 1900 election—and the Democrats subsequently taking this Progressive mantle through the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 (and later cementing much of this ideology as Democratic policy by electing FDR). Despite multiple attempts to start their own party, the Progressives were unable to do so because of the influence and absorption power of the parties already in existence. Thus, though evolving ideologically, the US has maintained its two-party system.
In this regard, it is unlikely that India’s democracy will be characterized by the two-party system in the US today. The Chief Election Commissioner of India reported that the 2019 electorate consisted of 900 million people, almost three times the population of the US. While population size is not the only factor in ideological diversity, such a huge electorate ensures variability of ideas. Corruption, a major problem in India, is unlikely to be stopped at local levels—partly because the infeasibility of managing such a huge electorate—and could always have an impact on the government’s makeup. Combining this variability with corruption could leave India in a permanent state of political party “disarray”. The number of parties will always impact Indian elections and leave low vote share numbers in its wake, leading to dissatisfaction among the general population and anti-incumbency. In India, the amount of power wielded by the political parties over representatives ensures that MPs will be at a disadvantage during election seasons. With the parliamentary democracy in place and the “numbers game” constantly at work, the parties’ desire to win seats at the cost of putting politicians in the right place will ultimately lead to higher anti-incumbency as the general population ends up with candidates with whom they are dissatisfied. II. Corruption/Funding
The true measure of a democracy’s strength is faith in the system. Citizens need to believe that they can make a positive difference through the polls. Despite the fact that India boasts the world’s largest electorate, trust problems still persist. While Americans are also trusting their government less than at any point in history, there is no effect on incumbency rates in the US. India’s high anti-incumbency rates have been caused by higher levels of corruption—an issue that affects election funding, constituent trust, and the game of Indian politics as a whole.
Higher trust in government would theoretically be an indicator of higher incumbency rates. The more lawmakers are trusted, the more likely they are to stay in power and continue decision-making for the people. In some ways, the data support this idea. A public opinion survey before the 2019 Lok Sabha election showed that government officials and political parties were the two least trusted public entities in the country, with political parties at the bottom of the list. The results of the election fit this public narrative. However, trust in Parliament as a whole was above 50%. These conflicting data points provide an interesting comparison with the US, where the opposite seems to be true. Trust in the government as a whole is at 17% as of March 2019, one of the lowest figures in US history. Yet the majority of people still think that “their own representative in Congress is doing a good job.” This separation of government officials from the legislative body as a whole gives context to both recent elections. In India, the population reelected only 42% of the Lok Sabha but still kept the BJP in power. In contrast, American citizens reelected 91% of Congress but switched the House from Republican to Democratic. These statistics again relate back to the Indian political parties’ “numbers game”; while American candidates develop connections with their constituents and local issues, the Indian parties shift around candidates simply to win seats and implement an agenda, thus leading to high anti-incumbency rates.
The mistrust in Indian politicians is reflected by high corruption levels in India. In its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2018, Transparency International gave India a score of 41/100, only good for 78th out of 180 countries where corruption levels were measured. The reasoning for this score—and the low scores of many other nations in the Asia Pacific region—stems from the lack of anti-corruption enforcement as well as rampant bribery. On the local level, paying bribes is still considered the most effective tool to get something done; in 2018, 56% of people admitted to paying a bribe in the last year (up from 45% in 2017). The presence of corruption on the national level was made clear when 99.3% of banned notes made their way back into circulation despite Prime Minister Modi banning these notes in an attempt to minimize “black money” (money used for illegal activity). The US, while falling out of the top twenty least-corrupt countries, still held a CPI score of 71/100. The four-point drop from 2017 points more to the scandals and constant unpredictability of the Trump administration rather than a long-term systemic problem (though challenges to checks and balances are a major part of the issue). The tendency of Indian politicians to focus on pleasing party leaders over constituents again rears its ugly head; as politicians take bribes and implement their party’s agenda, the general population is overlooked.
Criminality has also become a major factor in Indian elections. Studies have shown that candidates with at least one criminal case—not always a white-collar crime—on their record are three times more likely to win a parliamentary seat than candidates with clean records. The idea that Indian citizens have an inclination to vote in criminals is unlikely; monetary differences seem to be the more plausible cause of the success rate of criminals. Campaign costs have soared since India’s independence for many reasons, chief among them that the average parliamentary constituency has increased in each year since India’s independence and that voters expect to “extract” more in bribes as more and more parties arise. On average, criminal candidates in India are richer than their clean counterparts, and due to “costly elections… parties are likely to prioritize self-financing candidates who do not represent a drain on finite party coffers but can instead contribute ‘rents’[payments without strings attached] to the party.” Criminals have a strong presence in Parliament because they are often the only ones who can afford to run in the first place without relying on party funds. Once in office, however, these candidates often shift their focus towards using their power in a self-beneficial way; combined with ever-rising costs to elections, anti-incumbency becomes a likely scenario for many criminal politicians.
In addition to the corruption behind the work of politicians, Indian elections tend to be corrupt events themselves. Funding is one of the root causes of this problem. Election funding statistics have been very unclear since India became an independent republic as the vast majority of money—especially large deposits—has come from anonymous donors. During the 2017 Union Budget speech, then-Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced the proposed implementation of electoral bonds (that has since been approved) in order to “cleanse the system of funding of political parties.” Electoral bonds essentially acted as a bank note specifically for donating to a political party of one’s choice. The bonds, which could only be bought from the State Bank of India (SBI), were meant to increase transparency in the system; however, the fact that donors could remain anonymous provided an avenue for corporations to give massive donations without having to show face for them. Before the creation of electoral bonds, donors had to report any donation exceeding ₹20,000 ($280.60); in this past election, however, companies and wealthy individuals were free to donate up to ₹1 crore ($140,300) anonymously. A background report published by the Association for Democratic Reform (ADR) noted that the money was “‘subject to a digital trail, but this is explicitly meant to be off-limits to the media, civil society, and the general public.’” In the 2019 Lok Sabha election, 99.38% of all bonds sold were either ₹10 lakh or ₹1 crore, signaling that the bonds were mostly purchased by wealthy entities and that there was “hardly any demand for bonds of lower denomination”—the bonds that the common person could purchase. Lower bonds were available but not bought; thus, the implementation of electoral bonds produced the worst possible result. Electoral bonds further clouded the system and increased the likelihood of a larger presence of “black money” in elections. Jagdeep Chokkar, the founder of ADR, noted that the bonds have “‘the potential to choke the flow of money to the opposition parties’” in reference to the fact that the BJP received 95% of all signed electoral bonds in the past election. The main problem, however, is not that one party could receive all bonds but that corporate actors working on an individual agenda could regularly alter the fate of an entire country without ever being identified by the public.
The US also faces undisclosed funding problems in its elections. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) was created to regulate both Congressional and presidential campaign donations, and the government-run organization has placed donation limits on individuals, political action committees (PACs), and party committees. However, both corporations and super PACs—a recent spin-off of PACs—can raise and provide unlimited funds to candidates of their choice. In 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Citizens United v. FEC that “Section 441b[of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BPRA)]’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on free speech” under the First Amendment. A subsequent 2010 federal court case, SpeechNow.org v. FEC, followed this precedent to allow super PACs unlimited spending as well. The fact that super PACs and corporations can mask funds almost certainly ensures that “black money” plays a major role in both Congressional and presidential elections. However, the vast majority of reported donations during a campaign season go towards incumbents. In the Senate, the average Democratic incumbent candidate received around $13.1 million more than a Democratic challenger while the difference for Republicans (between average incumbent and challenger) was $6.2 million; in the House, the difference between Democratic and Republican incumbents and challengers was $920,259 and $1.9 million, respectively. The presence of super PACs, while clouding the system, certainly does not stop incumbents from regaining seats of power.
Both India and the US have suspicious funding mechanisms in elections. The primary difference, however, is that money in India goes to political parties while American campaign donations are directed at specific individuals. While the BJP did receive 95% of electoral bonds (mostly in large denominations), it was the party and not the candidates who decided how to allocate the funds during the 2019 election. As a party, the group was successful in gaining even more seats in Parliament; the cost, however, was felt by the politicians who were not reelected. Only wealthy politicians were able to fund their own elections—and their criminal tendencies to focus on their own agenda was likely detrimental to their reelection bids. Individual American incumbents were able to use funds as they please, thus leading to more reelections in Congress. Combined with political corruption, deep-rooted mistrust, and costly elections, the inherent qualities of the “numbers game” leads to high anti-incumbency in India. III. Economy
An intuitive aspect of democracy is that people vote based on their own quality of life. While one’s quality of life has many facets, economic success is the backbone of this concept. The US and India have both experienced economic progress in past decades; however, their societal and economic situations differ greatly. India’s relative economic failures have led to high anti-incumbency rates because the majority of the population has been left unsatisfied.
At a glance, India has experienced unprecedented economic growth. The average GDP annual growth rate since the creation of the Republic of India is 6.21%. The country has the seventh-largest economy in the world at $2.7 trillion and is projected to be the fifth-largest (passing the United Kingdom) by the end of 2019. By any developed country’s measure, India’s economy has succeeded. The key word, however, is “developed”. In its 2016 Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that 27.5% of people in India live in poverty—an improvement from 54.7% just ten years prior, but still a substantial portion of the population. In Prime Minister Modi’s first term, the country added 490,000 jobs per month—over two times as much as the American job growth rate, but not nearly sufficient to reaching the 10 million jobs per year that the Prime Minister promised (and that the country needs). In 2018, India’s PPP reached “an all time high” of $6,899.20—higher than the global poverty line but still well below the $12,490 income that defines the American poverty line. Since its independence, India has become an economic paradox—succeeding on the global stage, yet unable to help its own people.
India’s failures at the local level have affected its election results. Recent research shows that the top 1% of the country controlled 73% of the wealth, a staggering amount that highlights growing income inequality and correlates with the “numbers game” in politics and high corruption levels. While politicians report to their party leaders, the parties focuses on funneling money from the rich in different ways (as previously discussed). This chain of events omits the desires of common people from policy-making. On average, their lives are not up to par with global standards; thus, incumbents are removed from power when they fail to improve the general quality of life.
As demonstrated by anti-incumbency rates, the tendency in India is to remove politicians from power when success on the local level is minimal. This demand for results is short-sighted when considering two factors: a term is only five years long, and people vote for lofty promises such as fixing entire local water and electricity grids. The repeated induction of new people into Parliament does not bode well for long-term success at the level that India needs. In the recently elected Lok Sabha, 267 of the MPs (49%) are serving their first terms in government. In contrast, the average service tenure in the most recent US Congress is 10.1 years in the Senate and 8.6 years in the House. A lack of understanding of the positive effects of a long-term government coupled with a desire for immediate results (so as to fulfill the basic needs of constituents) leads to anti-incumbency. The former point can be potentially explained through the lens of education levels. According to the most recent Census data (taken in 2011), only 78 million people—6.4% of the population—had completed a higher secondary (pre-university) education. Meanwhile, in 2019 the percentage of Americans age 25 or over that completed at least high school reached 90% for the first time. Education systems seem like a distant connection to incumbency rates, especially in the US where voter tendencies are based largely on familiarity and trust in their own incumbent representatives (as discussed above). However, the fact that the vast majority of Indian citizens stopped attending school at the age of fourteen must be considered. As a result of low education levels, 900 million (around 65% of the population) go to the polls every year and vote to solve the problems of a third-world country despite likely having little to no understanding of the economy and other major issues.
The simple truth that the bulk of the Indian population has not been provided for gives a potential reason as to why few are reelected in Parliament. While large sects of both the Indian and American electorates are rather uninformed (or do not understand the nuances of economic and governmental policies), the average US citizen has a more financially stable life than the average Indian and is not in urgent need for immediate improvements in their quality of life. The inability of the Indian government to serve the majority of its population compared to the US is reflected in its high anti-incumbency rates. IV. Potential Solutions
Changes in India, especially those going against political institutions, would be very difficult to implement. Asking a successful group to renounce any amount of authority in itself is a monumental task without even considering the corruption factor. The ideas described below could be viewed as minor or significant alterations, depending on perspective. Regardless, increasing incumbency rates would require sacrifice. Political party decentralization—essentially a reduction of their power over representatives—would go a long way in fixing India’s anti-incumbency problem.
One potential solution could involve a rule to “personalize” the Indian election system. In the current system, political parties decide where their representatives will run. In turn, the representatives focus more on appealing to party leaders than assisting their constituents. Adopting the American rule that a representative must have lived in their state for at least seven years would automatically force the representative to become more involved in the community. Building a local base would become less of a funding (and bribing) scheme and more of a traditional political game in which the candidate must work to appeal to common people. Not only would this build a level of trust between citizens and representatives, the representative would have the ability to discuss and present solutions to problems in their district. Political challengers would have to build up a community base in the same manner. Overall, the community would benefit from increased attention from their representatives. American politicians in Congress are often criticized for focusing on “pork barrel” projects—legislation that they sneak into bills to help their individual states or districts. While often taken to excessive levels, the ubiquity of this type of legislation speaks to the emphasis that Congressmen put on taking care of constituents, a necessity in order to stay in power in the US. On the surface, this proposal looks detrimental to Indian political party leader, as they lose a significant amount of power in deciding where representatives will run during an election. However, representatives working to run in specific districts (rather than generally running for their party) would also allow parties to build up their presence in any given community. Assuming strong campaigning, incumbent parties would gain an advantage as well because their candidates would have spent much more time working within the communities than their challengers. Developing the relationship between representatives and constituents would go a long way in both helping communities and increasing incumbency rates.
Another solution—simultaneously introduced with the previous one—in the same vein of decentralization could focus on money allocation. In the current system, all “legal” (depending on how one views the electoral bond scheme) donations go directly to parties, who then decide how to run campaigns in the different states. As the parties focus less on keeping experienced politicians than simply gaining Lok Sabha seats, incumbents are cast away. Changing the campaign system by providing donors the option to give money to specific candidates would have the potential to flip incumbency rates for years to come. Politicians would have more of an ability to present both themselves and the party to the people, allowing the general population to better compare candidates for both policy points and persona. While not guaranteeing an increase in the reelection of incumbents, barring a truly catastrophic job in office, funding totals would likely favor the incumbent. Opponents of this idea might argue that permitting the direct funding of candidates would open up yet another door for “black money” to flow through. This is a valid concern not alleviated by the Indian Supreme Court’s recent indecision in the electoral bond case ADR v. Union of India (the court believes that it needs more time for an “in-depth hearing”). Short of mandating full reports of every donation regardless of amount (which some may view as an attack on privacy rights), eliminating corruption in such a large-scale democracy may be impossible. Be that as it may, providing candidates with autonomy over their own campaigns would release a burden off of party leaders, give the electorate another way to support favored candidates, and increase incumbency rates (provided that incumbent representatives capitalize on their access to constituents).
A discussion of improving the economy to fix anti-incumbency comes with caveats. While income inequality is a major problem (and only getting worse), the fact remains that the ordinary worker’s income rose by 2% from 2006-2015 and has continued to rise since. Prime Minister Modi has gone to great lengths to improve the lives of rural citizens, most notably his toilet initiative creating 87 million toilets around the country and his claim that every village now has electricity (though his definition of an “electrified” village puts in question the validity of this claim). On average, his measures have improved the lives of citizens and contributed to the reelection of his BJP. In spite of these improvements, the 2019 anti-incumbency rate in the Lok Sabha was quite high. The correlation between incumbency rates and national economic success only affects whole parties; in order to increase incumbency rates of individual representatives, economic improvements will have to come in conjunction with parties giving increased autonomy to their politicians. With representatives becoming more involved in communities, citizens will associate economic success with their representatives rather than the political party as a whole; thus, while economic development is an important step for India, progress must be accompanied by political party reforms.
As previously stated, the likelihood of parties implementing any change in the power structure is quite low. The changes described above would completely alter elections, and any change to a fundamental backbone of democracy would immediately spark controversy and potentially hostility. In addition, any representative bringing this bill to the floor would run the risk of being ostracized by their party, especially if the bill fails. The vast majority of representatives would be unlikely to fight the establishment. Yet any fix to complex solutions requires bold counters to the status quo. A challenge to parties on behalf of the Lok Sabha representatives could potentially lead to increased incumbency rates while improving the relationship between citizens and their representatives.